Detecting structural differences in tail dependence of financial time series by Bormann, Carsten & Schienle, Melanie
Detecting structural 
differences in tail dependence 
of financial time series
by Carsten Bormann and Melanie Schienle
No. 122  |  JANUARY 2019
WORKING PAPER SERIES IN ECONOMICS
KIT – Die Forschungsuniversität in der Helmholtz-Gemeinschaft econpapers.wiwi.kit.edu
Impressum
Karlsruher Institut für Technologie (KIT)
Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre (ECON)
Kaiserstraße 12
76131 Karlsruhe
KIT – Die Forschungsuniversität in der Helmholtz-Gemeinschaft 
Working Paper Series in Economics
No. 122, January 2019
ISSN  2190-9806
econpapers.wiwi.kit.edu
Detecting Structural Differences in Tail
Dependence of Financial Time Series
Carsten Bormann
Karlsruhe Institute of Technology
and
Melanie Schienle
Karlsruhe Institute of Technology
ABSTRACT
An accurate assessment of tail inequalities and tail asymmetries of financial
returns is key for risk management and portfolio allocation. We propose a new
test procedure for detecting the full extent of such structural differences in the
dependence of bivariate extreme returns. We decompose the testing problem
into piecewise multiple comparisons of Cramér-von Mises distances of tail cop-
ulas. In this way, tail regions that cause differences in extreme dependence
can be located and consequently be targeted by financial strategies. We derive
the asymptotic properties of the test and provide a bootstrap approximation
for finite samples. Moreover, we account for the multiplicity of the piecewise
tail copula comparisons by adjusting individual p-values according to multiple
testing techniques. Monte Carlo simulations demonstrate the test’s superior
finite-sample properties for common financial tail risk models, both in the i.i.d.
and the sequentially dependent case. During the last 90 years in US stock mar-
kets, our test detects up to 20% more tail asymmetries than competing tests.
This can be attributed to the presence of non-standard tail dependence struc-
tures. We also find evidence for diminishing tail asymmetries during every
major financial crisis – except for the 2007-09 crisis – reflecting a risk-return
trade-off for extreme returns.
Keywords: Tail dependence, tail copulas, tail asymmetry, tail inequality, ex-
treme values, multiple testing
JEL classification: C12, C53, C58
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1 INTRODUCTION
Asymmetric dependence both within and between bivariate extreme returns in
different market conditions is not only a key criterion for asset and risk man-
agement, but also a main focus of market supervision. During financial crises,
financial markets exhibit pronounced cross-sectional co-movements of (lower)
tails of return distributions. Thus, the tendency of joint extreme events inten-
sifies, see e.g. Longin and Solnik (2001); Ang and Chen (2002); Li (2013). For
investment strategies, this should be taken into account by timely and adequate
re-allocations of assets, e.g. profiting from arbitrage trading opportunities, and
by appropriate adjustments of hedging decisions. Conversely, risk managers
and market supervisors might need to set larger capital buffer requirements if
the tendency for joint occurrences of extreme losses rises in times of market dis-
tress. Specifically aiming at dependence between extreme events, we provide a
robust non-parametric statistical test against tail dependence differences. The
test accurately detects all types and the full extent of deviations between two
tail dependence functions. Our test procedure is based on multivariate ex-
treme value techniques which remain valid during turbulent market periods,
e.g. Mikosch (2006). Particular to finance, Ang and Chen (2002), Patton (2006),
Chollete et al. (2011), Li (2013) document the economic merits for asset diversi-
fication of asymmetric dependence structures, e.g. for optimal portfolio alloca-
tion. Under adverse market conditions, standard linear dependence measures
are flawed which demands for alternative statistical models. Most prominently,
the Gaussian copula is a convenient tool to model dependence near the mean of
multivariate distributions. However, it is not capable of measuring dependence
in the far tails (Embrechts (2009)). Furthermore, our test connects concepts of
multivariate extreme value theory with multiple testing techniques. Recently,
the latter have gained in practical importance in times of abundant data and
the risk of data snooping, see e.g. in the finance context Barras et al. (2010),
Bajgrowicz and Scaillet (2012) and Bajgrowicz et al. (2015) .
We propose a novel non-parametric test procedure against pairwise differ-
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ences in tail dependence structures which we measure with tail copulas de-
noted by Λ(x(1), x(2)), (x(1), x(2)) ∈ R2+. A tail copula is a functional of the complete
tail dependence. The flexibility of using empirical tail copulas avoids possi-
ble parametric misspecification risk; see e.g. Longin and Solnik (2001); Patton
(2013); Jondeau (2016) for parametric approaches. Furthermore, the general-
ity of this approach is in sharp contrast to established approaches, which only
estimate and compare scalar summary measures of extreme dependence, such
as the tail dependence coefficient (Hartmann et al. (2004), Straetmans et al.
(2008)), or the tail index of aggregated tails (Ledford and Tawn (1996)). Specif-
ically, we compare tail copulas over their entire relevant domain in a locally
piecewise way. Thus, we study a multiple testing problem of tail copula equal-
ity. Piecewise testing allows to pin down specific quantile regions where tail
dependence differences are most serious. Such areas then indicate those types
of extreme market conditions that typically cause tail asymmetry (inequality).
Moreover, our test is still consistent if one (or both) of the two considered tail
copulas is non-exchangeable, i.e. Λ(x(1), x(2)) 6= Λ(x(2), x(1)). Existing procedures
fail to address such intra-tail asymmetric dependence structures. Therefore,
for non-exchangeable tail copulas, those tests are inconsistent.
Our test builds on the idea of a two-sample goodness-of-fit test for tail copu-
las as in Bücher and Dette (2013). However, for increased sensitivity against vi-
olations of the null, we compare both tail copulas in a piecewise way on disjoint
subintervals of the unit simplex hull. This way, a number of individual tests
against tail dependence equality is carried out. For an accurate overall assess-
ment, we use multiple testing principles, such as the familywise error control
and the false discovery rate, to jointly control the error rate of all marginal tests.
Asymptotic properties of the test are provided. Moreover, a multiplier bootstrap
procedure is suggested by extending ideas of Bücher and Dette (2013) to non-
i.i.d. data.
A simulation study with widely used factor and Clayton copulas reveals the
test’s attractive finite sample properties both for i.i.d. and sequentially de-
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pendent time series data. In standard cases, our test is slightly superior to
competing tests, while it is much more powerful in case of intra-tail asymmet-
ric copulas. Simulation results strongly suggest that accounting for time series
dynamics is essential. This can be achieved by either GARCH pre-filtering or
by directly adjusting the bootstrap approximation for serial dependence.
In an empirical application, we establish tail asymmetry dynamics of 49 US
stock sectors for the last 90 years, i.e. dynamics of the differences between
upper and lower tails of all bivariate industry pairs. We find empirical evidence
that tail asymmetries substantially diminish in times of financial distress. The
only strong exception is the 2007-2009 financial crisis which apparently was
completely different in structure than any other crisis. We conclude dependence
between extreme gains increases in crisis. As the danger of joint extreme losses
surges during bear markets, this finding documents a type of extreme risk-
return trade-off as joint extreme gains are more likely compensating for the
increased risk of joint extreme losses. This contrasts with other studies that
analyze and compare market index pairs. Overall, our test detects up to 20%
more tail asymmetries than competing tests. This can specifically be attributed
to tail events not detected by standard tail dependence measures as the tail
dependence coefficient (TDC) (Hartmann et al. (2004); Jondeau (2016)), or the
tail copula-based test by Bücher and Dette (2013). Thus, our test could serve as
a more accurate tool for investors when assessing tail asymmetry in the market,
e.g. our test reveals more opportunities for improved tail asymmetry-based
portfolio allocation strategies. In the Appendix D of the online supplement
material, we also study tail inequalities between foreign exchange rates.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces theoretical results
on tail dependence necessary for the testing procedures. Section 3 introduces
our testing technique. It also provides asymptotic properties and respective fi-
nite sample versions of the test procedures. Section 4 studies the finite sample
performance in a thorough simulation study, and Section 5 studies tail asym-
metries of US stock sectors. Additionaly, we analyze tail inequalities between
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major foreign exchange rates in Appendix D of the online material. Finally,
Section 6 concludes. All proofs are contained in the Appendix of the paper.
2 TAIL DEPENDENCE AND TAIL COPULAS
To understand the test idea and test statistics, we shortly introduce necessary
tools from extreme value statistics. A complete treatment thereof can be found
e.g. in de Haan and Ferreira (2006). For a two-dimensional (random) return
vector X = (X(1), X(2)) its marginal components X(i) are assumed to have a con-
tinuous distribution function Fi(x(i)) and thus a well-defined marginal quantile
function F−1i for i = 1, 2.
Our test is based on the full dependence structure in the tails captured
by a tail copula. Note, standard dependence measures such as point corre-
lations, quantify the likelihood of aligned return movements of X(1) and X(2).
However, if returns of both assets are extreme, i.e. {X(i) > F−1i (1 − t)}, or
{X(i) < F−1i (t)}, i = 1, 2, for t → 0, standard dependence measures are insuf-
ficient, and thus measures that focus on the tails should be used, see e.g.
Embrechts (2009). For example, the Gaussian copula, which is completely
parametrized by the correlation coefficient, is unable to model any tail depen-
dence. That is to say, dependence may vary over different parts of the distribu-
tion, and correlation may be unable to measure dependence in the tails.
Measuring the complete tail dependence between X(1) and X(2), the upper
and lower tail copula ΛUX(x
(1), x(2)),ΛLX(x
(1), x(2)), x := (x(1), x(2)), x ∈ R2+, are defined
by
ΛUX(x
(1), x(2)) := lim
t→0
t−1P(X(1) > F−11 (1− tx(1)), X(2) > F−12 (1− tx(2))),
ΛLX(x
(1), x(2)) := lim
t→0
t−1P(X(1) < F−11 (tx(1)), X(2) < F−12 (tx(2))), t ∈ R+ (1)
i.e. the tail copula measures how likely both components jointly exceed ex-
treme quantiles, see e.g. de Haan and Ferreira (2006), Schmidt and Stadtmüller
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(2006), for details. If ΛUX(x) > 0 (Λ
L
X(x) > 0), gains (losses) of X are said to be tail
dependent. For the sake of notational brevity, we omit the superscripts U and
L unless it becomes important. With x = (1, 1), the tail copula boils down to the
tail dependence coefficient (TDC), ι := Λ(1, 1). The TDC is a standard tool in fi-
nancial applications to measure tail dependence, e.g. Frahm et al. (2005), Aloui,
Aïssa and Nguyen (2011), Garcia and Tsafack (2011). However, the TDC covers
only a fragment of tail dependence, namely dependence between joint quantile
exceedances of marginals thresholds along the line (F−11 (1− t), F−12 (1− t)), t→ 0.
In contrast, the tail copula varies marginal thresholds as (x(1), x(2)) ∈ R2+, and
describes tail association for every possible tail event. It can be shown that
ΛX(x
(1), x(2)) ∈ [0,min(x(1), x(2))], and ΛX(ax) = aΛX(x), a ∈ R. Due to this homo-
geneity of the tail copula, it is sufficient to analyze the tail copula ΛX(x) only on
the domain S ⊂ R2, where we set wlog S := {(x(1), x(2)) : x(1), x(2) ≥ 0, ||x||1 = 1}, as
the unit simplex hull. This restriction to the relevant domain of the tail copula
reduces computational efforts in practical implementation and is key for our
test.
In the following, we require the tail copulas of interest to exist and work in
the following setup.
Assumptions 1. For a bivariate random vector X, we assume that
(A1) X1, . . . ,Xn are i.i.d. observations of X ∼ FX.
(A2) FX is in the max-domain of a bivariate extreme value distribution with tail
copula ΛX > 0.
Assumption (A1) is standard in extreme value theory, yet restrictive for fi-
nancial time series. We use it to illustrate our test idea and to formally derive
its statistical properties. In Section 4.1, we then show how (A1) can be re-
laxed to stationarity and strongly mixing making the test applicable to financial
data. Assumption (A2) requires that sample tails can be modeled by bivariate
extreme value distributions and are asymptotically dependent for nonparamet-
ric estimators to be unbiased, see Schmidt and Stadtmüller (2006) for details
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why this excludes ΛX(x) = 0. Standard distributions with actual tail depen-
dence, such as e.g. the bivariate t-distribution with dispersion parameter ρ 6= 0,
meet this assumption. The Gaussian copula, however, violates (A2) due to tail
independence (Λ = 0 for |ρ| < 1).
The main focus of this paper is on comparing two tail copulas, in particular
in determining if differences of tail copulas exist and where there are located.
We formally distinguish between two important cases: tail asymmetry and tail
inequality. For their definition we require some notation first. We say two
tail copulas ΛX and ΛY differ if there exists a set I on the unit simplex S with
I ⊆ S ⊂ R2+ P(I) > 0 such that for all (x(1), x(2)) ∈ I
{
ΛX(x
(1), x(2)) 6= ΛY(x(1), x(2))
}
or
{{ΛX(x(1), x(2)) 6= ΛY(x(2), x(1))}} . (2)
We write shorthand ΛX 6= ΛY for Equation (2). Tail asymmetry occurs if upper
and lower tail copula of the same return vector X differ.
Definition 1 (Tail asymmetry). A return vector X is tail asymmetric if ΛLX 6= ΛUX .
To detect tail asymmetry, one should compare ΛUX(x
(1), x(2)) not only with
ΛLX(x
(1), x(2)) and but also with the flipped components version ΛLX(x
(2), x(1)). In
practice, the return vector X exhibits tail asymmetry whenever the likelihood
for co-movements of extreme losses differs from that of extreme gains. For
example, in terms of Value at Risk (VaR) exceedances, ΛLX > Λ
U
X implies joint
exceedances of loss VaRs are more likely to occur than those of gain VaRs.
If for two different return vectors ΛX 6= ΛY, we call this tail inequality.
Definition 2 (Tail inequality). Return vectors X and Y exhibit tail inequality if
ΛWX 6= ΛZY ,W, Z = U,L.
Tail inequality can be assessed in order to compare competing portfolios with
respect to their sensitivity to extreme events. For example, ΛLX > Λ
L
Y implies
joint exceedances of loss VaRs for those portfolio X are more likely to occur
than those portfolio Y, i.e. X exhibits a stronger tail risk of joint losses than Y.
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Similarly, if ΛUX < Λ
L
Y, joint extreme losses in portfolio Y are more intertwined
than joint extreme gains in X.
One reason for differences in tail copulas may be intra-tail asymmetry of at
least one of the tail copulas considered, where intra-tail asymmetry refers to
asymmetry within a single tail copula in the following sense. A return vector
X is intra-tail asymmetric if ΛWX (x(1), x(2)) 6= ΛWX (x(2), x(1)), (x(1), x(2)) ∈ S,W = U,L.
Intra-tail asymmetry refers a single vector X and a single tail and occurs when-
ever the corresponding tail copula is not symmetric with respect to its argu-
ments x = (x(1), x(2)), i.e. if the tail copula is not exchangeable with respect to
X(1) and X(2). For example, let x(1) = 0.2, x(2) = 0.8 and t = 0.05. Then, intra-tail
asymmetry is present if the tail event {X(1) > V aR1(0.99)} ∩ {X(2) > V aR2(0.96)}
is differently likely than the tail event {X(1) > V aR1(0.96)} ∩ {X(2) > V aR2(0.99)}.
The following proposition illustrates the importance of intra-tail asymmetry for
comparisons of tail dependence functions.
Proposition 1. If ΛWX (x
(1), x(2)) with W ∈ {U,L} is intra-tail asymmetric, then ΛWX 6=
ΛHZ for (Z, H) ∈ {(X,W ), (Y, U), (Y, L)}, whereW denotes the complement ofW , and
X,Y are bivariate random vectors with according tail copulas.
To see this, assume ΛWX (x
(1), x(2)) = ΛHZ (x
(1), x(2)). As ΛWX (x
(1), x(2)) 6= ΛWX (x(2), x(1)),
it holds ΛWX (x
(2), x(1)) 6= ΛHZ (x(1), x(2)), and Equation (2) applies. If ΛWX (x),W = U,L,
is asymmetric with respect to x, any comparison with that tail copula auto-
matically amounts to tail asymmetry (inequality) as there is always a point on
the unit simplex hull where both tail copulas differ. While parametric mod-
els for intra-tail asymmetric tails exist, e.g. the asymmetric logistic copula in
Tawn (1988), and factor copulas in Einmahl et al. (2012), intra-tail symmetry
is implicitly assumed to hold in all standard tests for tail dependence differ-
ences. However, we find this phenomenon should not be ruled out ex- ante as
we detect a considerable amount of intra-tail asymmetries in our comprehen-
sive empirical study for the U.S. stock market in Section 5, and also for foreign
exchange rate pairs, similar findings hold, see Bormann (2016).
As the tail copula is the main component for our test, we sketch relevant
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statistical results for appropriate estimators. To keep notation short, for the
remainder of this section we only state the definition, assumptions and re-
sults for the estimator in the lower tail case. The upper tail version follows
analogously from (1). For estimation of ΛX(x), marginal quantile functions
F−1i,X , i = 1, 2, are approximated non-parametrically by the empirical counterpart
F̂−1i,X (x) =
1
n+1
∑n
j=1 1{X(i)j ≤ x} for each x and i = 1, 2. As marginals are typically
unknown, empirical distributions yield sufficient flexibility for obtaining con-
sistent estimates in a general setup. The reduced model misspecification risk,
however, comes at the price of lower efficiency in comparison to parametric es-
timates based on the correct but in practice unknown form of the marginals. In
the case of the later discussed multiplier bootstrap for tail copulas, however, in-
ference is substantially complicated by accounting for pre-estimated marginals
requiring multipliers also in the input marginals for an overall unbiased proce-
dure (Bücher and Dette (2013)).
For an estimator of ΛL, the limit in the definition of the tail copula (1) is
replaced by the value at an arbitrary small point t = kX/n = O(n) with the
sample size n→∞ and the effective sample size kX →∞, kX ∈ O(n). A consistent
estimator is then given by
Λ̂LX(x
(1), x(2)) =
1
kX
n∑
m=1
1
{
X(1)m < F̂
−1
1,X(kX/nx
(1)), X(2)m < F̂
−1
2,X(kX/nx
(2))
}
,
(x(1), x(2)) ∈ S. By directly defining the quantile threshold F−1i,X (kX/nx(i)), i = 1, 2,
the effective sample size kX determines which observations are considered ex-
treme. The choice of the tuning parameter kX is subject to a bias-variance
trade-off: For small values of kX only few observations are used for estimation,
which increases the variance while the approximation of empirical tails by ex-
treme value distributions becomes more precise (low bias). On the other hand,
using many observations for tail estimation (large kX) amounts to less disperse
estimates (low variance), but the tail approximation may not be valid for less
extreme observations (large bias).
9
Under assumption1 asymptotic results for the empirical tail copula can thus
be derived for appropriate assumptions on the tuning parameter kX and minor
smoothness conditions on Λ(x), see Bücher and Dette (2013).
Assumptions 2. For a bivariate random vector X we assume
(A3) kX →∞ and kXn → 0 for n→∞.
(A4) It holds that |Λ(x) − tCX(x/t)| = O(A(t)), for t → ∞, and some function A :
R+ 7→ R+ with limt→∞A(t) = 0 and
√
kXA(n/kX)→ 0 for n→∞, where CX(x) :=
P(F1(X(1)) ≤ x(1), F2(X(2)) ≤ x(2)) denotes the copula of X.
(A5) The partial derivatives ∂Λ(x
(1),x(2))
∂x(i)
, exist and are continuous for x(i) ∈ R+\{0}.
Assumption (A3) requires that the effective sample size kX increases more
slowly than n for n → ∞ for consistency. The second-order regular variation
condition (A4) (see Bücher and Dette (2013)) requires the bias of the tail cop-
ula approximation to vanish sufficiently fast with rate A which is also key for
an appropriate multiplier bootstrap procedure to work. In practice, this only
imposes a corresponding slightly tighter condition on the expanding rate of kX.
It is satisfied by standard tail distributions such as e.g. the Clayton copula,
where A(t) is asymptotically of order 1/tθ with θ > 0. Then kX should be at
most of order n
2θ
1+2θ < n in order to satisfy the conditions. For completeness, we
state Assumption (A5). Nevertheless, this smoothness assumption may also be
omitted. This results in a more complex limiting behavior of the empirical tail
copula, which permits consistent estimation of tail copulas of factor models,
see Bücher et al. (2014).
Under Assumptions (A1)-(A5), the asymptotic distribution for the tail copula
can be derived as
√
kX(Λ̂X(x
(1), x(2))− ΛX(x(1), x(2))) w→ GΛ̂,X(x(1), x(2)) (3)
where w→ denotes weak convergence in sup-norm over each compact set in R2+ in
the sense of Hoffmann-Jørgensen (see, e.g., ?) , and GΛ̂,X is a bivariate Gaussian
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field of the form
GΛ̂,X(x
(1), x(2)) = GΛ˜,X(x
(1), x(2))− ∂Λ(x
(1), x(2))
∂x(1)
GΛ˜,X(x
(1),∞)− ∂Λ(x
(1), x(2))
∂x(2)
GΛ˜,X(∞, x(2))
with GΛ˜,X(x(1), x(2)) a centered Gaussian field with covariance
E(GΛ˜,X(x
(1), x(2))GΛ˜,X(v
(1), v(2))) = Λ(min(x(1), v(1)),min(x(2), v(2))), (v(1), v(2)) ∈ R2+.
These results were first established in Schmidt and Stadtmüller (2006); Bücher
and Dette (2013) and Bücher et al. (2014) provide related results while also
relaxing (A5), i.e. existence of partial derivatives of the tail copula is generally
not needed. This is important in practice, as it covers not only smooth standard
models for tail models, but also practically relevant tail dependence model that
may arise from (tail) factor models.
3 A NEW TESTING METHODOLOGY AGAINST TAIL
ASYMMETRY AND INEQUALITY
3.1 Test Idea, Asymptotic Properties, and Implementation
Generally, we test the global null hypothesis of equality between tail copulas
by checking for local violations of the null over a collection of disjoint subsets
of the relevant support (S). This localization provides additional insights on
specific quantile areas which might be a valuable target for adequate risk or
portfolio management strategies.
When testing against tail equality, our test takes into account that each of
the return vectors could be intra-tail asymmetric. In case of intra-tail asym-
metry, statistical tests are only consistent if all possible permutations of argu-
ments in the tail copulas are considered, i.e. checking both ΛZ(x(1), x(2)) and
ΛZ(x
(2), x(1)),Z = X,Y). This contrasts sharply with the TDC-based test by Hart-
mann et al. (2004), abbreviated as TDC test, which only compares tail copulas
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at a single point of the domain. Yet, we account for possible tail differences
within the entire domain of both tail copulas. Our test is closely related to the
test by Bücher and Dette (2013), abbreviated as BD13 test, which compares
the tail copula of X with the tail copula of Y = (Y (1), Y (2)) along the unit cir-
cle. However, as tail copula differences are only evaluated in one direction,
their test statistic is not exchangeable, i.e. for the test statistic S it holds that
S(X, (Y (1), Y (2))) 6= S(X, (Y (2), Y (1))). To fix this, we propose to analyze tail copula
differences in both directions of the unit simplex hull searching for differences
between tail copulas over distinct, pre-determined subintervals of the unit sim-
plex. In this way, test power strongly benefits from intra-tail asymmetric tail
copulas, while in standard intra-tail symmetric cases it features similar, yet
slightly better test properties as competing tests.
For ease of exposition, in the following we focus in notation on the test
against tail inequality. Results for the test against tail asymmetry can be di-
rectly obtained by exchanging ΛX by ΛUX and ΛY by Λ
L
X. We apply M Cramér-von
Mises tests on M/2 disjoint subintervals of the unit simplex S where the decom-
position of S is complete, i.e. the union of these subsets equals S. The global
null hypothesis is
H0 : ΛX = ΛY over S, a.s.,
consisting of M individual null hypotheses of the form
H0,m : ΛX(φ, 1− φ) =
 ΛY(φ, 1− φ), φ ∈ Im, m = 1, . . .M/2ΛY(1− φ, φ), φ ∈ Im−M/2, m = (M/2) + 1 . . .M,
where I1, ..., IM/2 are complete decomposition of [0, 1] into disjoint, equidistant
subintervals. Note that global tail equality H0 :
⋂M
m=1 H0,m naturally implies tail
equality over each subset. Empirical marginal test statistics are given by
Ŝm(X,Y) =

kXkY
kX+kY
∫
Im(Λ̂X(φ, 1− φ)− Λ̂Y(φ, 1− φ))2 dφ, m = 1, . . .M/2
kXkY
kX+kY
∫
I
m−M2
(Λ̂X(φ, 1− φ)− Λ̂Y(1− φ, φ))2 dφ, m = (M/2) + 1 . . .M.
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Each marginal test corresponds to a specific subset of S, which can be
translated to a subspace of the sample. The switch of arguments in ΛY for
m ≥ (M/2) + 1 guarantees that tail copulas are compared over the entire unit
simplex, e.g. in both directions. If H0,m is true, Ŝm ≈ 0, while Sm > 0 otherwise.
The following proposition provides the marginal test distributions in the i.i.d.
case. Subsection 4.1 discusses extensions for time series data.
Proposition 2. Let Assumptions (A1)-(A4) hold for X,Y.
Then under H0 for each m = 1, ...,M
Ŝm
w→ Sm ,
where
Sm =
∫
Im
(√
1− λGΛ̂,X(φ, 1− φ)−
√
λGΛ̂,Y(φ, 1− φ)
)2
dφ,
with λ = limn→∞ kXkX+kY ∈ (0, 1).
Under H1,however, ∃m : Ŝm P→∞.
Note, the processes GΛ̂,X,GΛ̂,Y correspond to GΛ̂(x(1), x(2)) from Equation (3).
Due to the complexity of the limiting stochastic processes, closed forms of the
asymptotic distributions do not exist and have to be simulated. Therefore we
follow Bücher and Dette (2013) and approximate the finite sample distribution
of (Ŝm) by a multiplier bootstrap for each m = 1, . . . ,M . See also Scaillet (2005)
and Rémillard and Scaillet (2009) who introduced multiplier techniques for cop-
ula inference. For the construction of the bootstrap version of the test statistic,
we require the definition of Z-specific multipliers ξZi where Z ∈ {X,Y} helps to
streamline notation.
Assumptions 3 (cont.).
(A6) Multipliers ξZi are iid random variables with E(ξZi ) = V(ξZi ) = 1. and E[|ξZi |ν ] <
∞ for ν > 1 which are independent of Z for all i = 1, . . . , nZ.
For each bootstrap draw b = 1, . . . , B of these multipliers ξZ,(b)1 , . . . , ξ
Z,(b)
nZ , we
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can construct Ŝm,(b) for m = 1, . . . ,M
Ŝm,(b)(X,Y) =
kXkY
kX + kY
∫
Im
(
(Λ̂
(b)
X (φ, 1− φ)− Λ̂X(φ, 1− φ))−
(Λ̂
(b)
Y (φ, 1− φ)− Λ̂Y(φ, 1− φ))
)2 dφ, (4)
where Λ̂(b)Z (x) for Z ∈ {X,Y} is obtained with standardized multipliers ξ˜Z,(b)i =
ξ
Z,(b)
i /ξ
Z,(b)
i , i = 1, ..., nZ as
Λ̂
(b)
Z (x
(1), x(2)) =
1
kZ
nZ∑
i=1
ξ˜
Z,(b)
i 1
{
Z
(1)
i ≥ F˜−11,Z(1− (kZ/nZ)x(1)), Z(2)i ≥ F˜−12,Z(1− (kZ/nZ)x(2))
}
F˜j,Z(x) =
1
nZ
nZ∑
i=1
ξ˜Zi 1
{
Z
(j)
i ≤ x
}
, j = 1, 2, (5)
Note that not only the empirical tail copula, but also the empirical marginal dis-
tributions require multiplier bootstrapping for the procedure to yield consistent
results. The sample size could theoretically differ for X and Y which is marked
by the index of nZ.
Then the bootstrap version Ŝm,? of the test statistic Sm is obtained as the
empirical distribution of Ŝm,(1), . . . Sm,(B)
The following asymptotic result shows the weak convergence of Ŝm,? to the
same asymptotic distribution as Ŝm, conditional on the bootstrap samples.
Moreover, it ensures consistency of the multiplier bootstrap version of the test
in the i.i.d. case.
Proposition 3. Let (A1)-(A6) hold. Then underH0, conditionally on the multipliers,
Ŝm,?
w→ Sm,m = 1, ...,M,
while under H1,∃m : Ŝm,? P→∞.
In practice for the i.i.d. case, we set ξi ∼ Exp(1). Note, whenever X and Y are
dependent, one has to use the same multiplier series for both X and Y. Finally,
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a consistent Monte Carlo p-value for hypothesis H0,m is given by
p̂m =
1 +
∑B
b=1 1{Ŝm ≥ Ŝm,(b)}
B + 1
.
Joint testing of M hypothesis requires an adjustment of the individual test
level α to control the error rate of the global hypothesis, α∗, say. Common error
rates are the familywise error rate (FWER) and the false discovery rate (FDR).
In general, for a family of M individual hypotheses H0,1, H0,2, ..., H0,M , FDR
controls for the expected number of falsely rejected marginal null hypotheses
among all rejections, i.e.
FDR := E
(∑M
m=1 1{pm ≤ αm|H0,i}∑M
m=1 1{pm ≤ αm}
)
≤ α.
The Benjamini-Hochberg algorithm (Benjamini and Hochberg (1995)) sorts all
p-values p(1), ..., p(M), starting with the smallest one, and compares p(i) with i
M
α
where i denotes the rank of p-value p(i). If p(i) < i
M
α, marginal hypotheses
corresponding to p-values p(1), ..., p(i) are rejected. Adjusted p-values are p˜(i) =
p(i)M
i
and are compared with α∗. The FWER controls for the probability of at
least false rejection at a prefixed threshold α, say α = 5%, i.e.
P(∪Mm=1{pm ≤ αm|H0,m}) ≤ α,
where pm denotes the marginal p-value and αm is determined by the multiple
testing method such that the inequality holds. For the well-known Bonferroni
control, αm = α/M . Equivalently, individual p-values are adjusted as p˜m = pmM
and marginal hypotheses are rejected if p˜m < α.
In general, controlling the BH-FDR control is not as conservative as the
FWER-Bonferroni correction. Also, BH-FDR is better suited for (positively) de-
pendent p-values, which is a natural assumption for our setting. However, as
we find in our simulations, test performance is only slightly affected by the
choice of error rate, and thus we choose BH-FDR with α∗ = 0.05. See Romano
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and Wolf (2005) for an overview of multiple testing methods with applications
to financial data.
The practical implementation of the basic test works as follows.
Test algorithm (1).
1. Determine kX, kY, and estimate both tail copulas, i.e. calculate Λ̂X(φ, 1 −
φ), Λ̂Y(φ, 1− φ), φ ∈ [0, 1].
2. Set M . Decompose [0, 1] into M/2 disjoint, equally sized subintervals, i.e. I1,
..., IM/2.
3. Calculate Ŝm,m = 1, ...,M .
4. Set B. Calculate Ŝm,? with Ŝm,(b), b = 1, ..., B for m = 1, ...,M,.
5. Calculate p̂m,m = 1, ...,M .
6. Fix an error rate α. Apply a multiple testing routine on p̂1, ..., p̂M and decide
on the global null hypothesis.
This test is, independent of the multiple testing method, asymptotically
valid. E.g. for the FDR it holds that limn,B→∞ FDR = e ≤ α, and in case of
FWER, limn,B→∞ P
( ∪Mm=1 {pm ≤ αm|H0}) = f ≤ α. Unless otherwise stated, in sim-
ulations and applications we work with B = 1499 bootstrap repetitions; note the
necessary correction of B (1499 instead of 1500) which ensures consistency of
the p-value.
The choice of M is subject to a trade-off between test power and precision
of localization of tail differences. A larger M amounts to lower power as less
data fall into finer subintervals, and the multiplicity penalty of the individual
p-values increases in M , making rejections even less likely. A larger M also
means, the tests very precisely pin down very narrow subintervals with sig-
nificant tail dependence differences. In the extreme case, where M → ∞, the
test algorithm carries out an infinite number of TDC-type tests. While this is a
theoretically valid test, test power would implode as the harsh p-value adjust-
ment and the decreasing number of observations in small subsets would almost
never suggest a test rejection due to the strong multiplicity penalty. Simula-
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tions suggest a choice of M = 26 is reasonable as this also keeps computational
effort manageable.
However, as we do not strive to determine an optimal number of subsets
we suggest to apply the test several times over a set of grids. Consequently,
we combine p-values of the different grids to one embracing test and we refrain
from any further multiplicity adjustment.
Test algorithm (2).
1. For J different grids that increase in grid fineness, individually execute Test
Algorithm (1) with Mj subsets, where Mj = 2j, j = 1, ..., J.
2. For each grid, adjust the p-values for multiplicity: (p˜11, p˜
2
1), ..., (p˜
1
J , ..., p˜
2J
J ).
3. For each grid, pick the minimal adjusted p-value:
(p˜∗1 = min(p˜
1
1, p˜
2
1), ..., p˜
∗
J = min(p˜
1
J , ..., p˜
2J
J )).
4. Reject the global H0 if at least one p˜∗j is smaller than α.
Note, this aggregating test does not adjust the grid-specific p-values a sec-
ond time. This approach would control exactly for the error rate α, if p˜∗1, ..., p˜
∗
J
were perfectly dependent, i.e. . For asymptotic control, however, we can re-
lax this condition to nearly perfect dependence, see condition 6 below. This is
important, as assuming perfect dependence between grid-minimal p-values is
much more rigid than postulating only nearly perfect dependence. For simplic-
ity, we state the following result only for FWER control. We denote αj as the
asymptotic test size of the jth Test (1).
Proposition 4. For Test (2), if
P(∪Jj=1p˜∗j ≤ α|H0) ↑ max(α1, ..., αJ), as J →∞, (6)
it holds that
lim
n,B,→∞
P(∪Jj=1p˜∗j ≤ α|H0) = α.
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The the proof of Proposition 4 condition 6 is key, and also that (realized) test
sizes of Test (1) converge to zero as M →∞.
Simulation results from Section 4 confirm that Condition 6 appears to be
satisfied in standard settings. We find Test (2) consistently obeys the α-limit
due to individual undersizedness of Test (1) and nearly perfect dependence
between grid-minimal p-values. Figure 1, which shows p-values of one specific
setting, illustrates that both these points hold; results of other settings are in
line, but not reported. We see that individual test sizes are consistently below α,
and decrease in the number of marginal hypotheses. Furthermore, correlation
between minimal p-values of different grids is close to one, indicating nearly
perfect (linear) dependence. Hence, we find Test (2) is appropriate.
Generally, it would be desirable to provide a lower bound of the strength of
dependence between the p-values, i.e. a sufficient convergence rate in Con-
dition 6. Convergence rates of individual test sizes and the unknown p-value
dependence structure determine this lower bound. Unfortunately, to explicitly
state this bound in our setting, we would have to assume specific closed-form
distributions for the test statistics (Proschan and Shaw (2011)), or specific para-
metric dependence model for the p-values, see Stange et al. (2015) and Bodnar
and Dickhaus (2014). Yet, the precise dependence structure between the p-
values is unknown, whereas tails of the test distributions may be approximated
by χ2 distributions, see Beran (1975).
3.2 Local Tail Asymmetry
One main feature of our test is that we can localize tail dependence differences.
This enriches the binary test decision on tail asymmetry/inequality as we can
find subspaces in R2+ where tail asymmetry/inequality can be expected. If the
global null is rejected, significant individual p-values trace the subsets of the
unit simplex hull where both tail copulas differ. The boundary points of the
significant subsets amount to empirical quantile threshold vectors which span
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Figure 1: Exemplary p-values from the simulation study for Test (1) with j =
1, ..., 13 (GARCH marginals equipped with a Factor model, k = 0.1n, n = 1500,
tapered bootstrap). In this case, test size is estimated with 500 repetitions. Left:
Scatterplots of p-values for all grid pairs. Middle: J, the fineness of the grids,
is plotted against estimated test sizes according to Test (1). Right: Histogram of
estimated correlations between all pairs of grid-minimal p-values.
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a tail asymmetric subspace in the sample space, i.e.
QX =
(
F−11,X(1− k/nx(1)), F−11,X(1− k/nx(2))
)
×
(
F−12,X(1− k/nx(1))), F−12,X(1− k/nx(2))
)
,
QY =
(
F−11,Y(1− k/nx(1)), F−11,Y(1− k/nx(2))
)
×
(
F−12,Y(1− k/nx(1))), F−12,Y(1− k/nx(2))
)
.
Due to the homogeneity of the tail copulas, these extreme sets can be extrap-
olated arbitrarily far into the tail, given the extreme value conditions hold. In
particular, Figure 2 illustrates how to trace tail asymmetry.
Thus, when comparing tail dependencies of return vectors, our test pro-
vides precise information on which specific tail events, or VaR events, cause
tail dependence differences. Conditional on realized returns of X (Y) falling into
QX (QY), tail dependence of X and Y differ; conditional on X(Y) /∈ QX (QY), ΛX
and ΛY do not differ significantly.
This additional information might improve tail risk anticipation for regula-
tors, or tail risk-based hedge and trading strategies for investors as those mar-
ket times are identified which typically induce behavior of bivariate extremes to
shift.
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Figure 2: Left and right: Upper-right quadrants of scatterplots for X,Y, both
equipped with an asymmetric logistic copula and marginal distributions X(i) ∼
t(df = 3), Y (i) ∼ t(df = 10), i = 1, 2. The corresponding tail copula is Λ(x(1), x(2)) =
x(1) + x(2) − [(1 − ψ(1))x(1) + (1 − ψ(2))x(2) + ((ψ(1)x(1))−θ + (ψ(2)x(2))−θ)θ] (see Tawn
(1988)), with parameters (ψ(1), ψ(2), θ) = (0.1, 0.6, 0.1), (ψ(1), ψ(2), θ) = (0.1, 0.5, 0.4).
The shaded rectangles show the tail asymmetric tail regions; the homogeneity of
the tail copula allows to extrapolate this region far into the sample tail. Center:
Estimated tail copulas for x(1) ∈ {0.01, 0.02, ..., 0.99}, k = 500, n = 10000,M = 8. The
shaded area indicates over which subset both tail copulas significantly differ.
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4 FINITE SAMPLE STUDY
4.1 Serially Dependent Data
In general for financial time series, the i.i.d. assumption (A1) cannot be fulfilled
as financial data typically exhibit strong serial dependence. Though, standard
extreme value theory and the multiplier bootstrap rely on the independence
assumption. We therefore consider two different approaches to address this
problem.
The standard applied approach is to fit an appropriate time series speci-
fication, such as e.g. ARMA-GARCH, to the financial raw returns and work
with obtained standardized residuals. For a valid time series pre-filter, the lat-
ter should roughly resemble an i.i.d. series, and can thus be used for further
inference (see, e.g. McNeil and Frey (2000) in the univariate case). It is in-
tuitively clear, that asymptotically such parametric pre-whitening at rate
√
n
should not affect rate and consistency of the slower converging nonparametric
tail dependence estimates and thus of the test statistics. In practice, however,
the pre-step might still lead in particular to second order effects in the variance
for finite samples. In the following subsection we show that such effects are
negligible for our test at considered standard sample sizes.
For empirical copulas of dependent data, another remedy is to assume sta-
tionarity coupled with appropriate mixing conditions, which consequently allow
to directly use unfiltered returns for estimation. Valid statistical inference is
ensured by adjusting the bootstrap procedure: For strongly mixing time series,
convergence of the block bootstrap and the so-called tapered block multiplier
bootstrap has been shown for the empirical copula process, Bücher and Rup-
pert (2013). Necessary assumptions are met for a wide class of time series
models, such as ARMA and GARCH models. We suggest to use the dependent
data bootstrap methodology also for empirical tail copulas.
We therefore replace the iid multipliers with a dependent multiplier sequence
defined as follows
21
Assumptions 2.
(A6a∗) The tapered block multiplier process (ξj,n)j=1,...,n is strictly stationary with
E[ξ0,n] = 0, E[ξ20,n] = 0 , and E[|ξ0,n|ν ] < ∞ for all ν ≥ 1 independent of
Z1, . . . ,Zn.
(A6b∗) For any j, ξj,n is independent of ξj+h,n for all h ≥ l(n) where l(n) is a strictly
positive, deterministic sequence with l(n)→∞ and l(n) = O(n).
(A6c∗) For any h ∈ Z, there exists v : R → [0, 1] such that E(ξ0,n, ξh,n) = v(h/l(n))
where v continuous at 0 and symmetric around 0 with v(0) = 1 and v(x) = 0
for |x| > 1.
Instead of the i.i.d. Assumption (A1) the underlying stochastic process
Z ∈ {X,Y} is required to be strictly stationary and αZ-mixing with αZ(r) =
αZ(Fs,Fs+r) = supA∈Fs,B∈Fs+r |P(A∩B)−P(A)P(B)|, for the (Z1, . . .Zt)-induced filtra-
tion Ft. The rate of decay αZ(r) = O(r−aZ) where aZ > 0 for r > 0 marks the degree
of admissible serial dependence. In contrast to standard copulas, weak conver-
gence of empirical tail copulas in an α-mixing set-up is a challenging problem
which has only been touched upon very recently in special cases so far, see e.g.
Bücher and Ruppert (2013) and Bücher and Segers (2017). A general proof is
beyond the scope of this paper, however, the later paper suggests, that this is
possible under fairly general conditions in our bivariate set-up, in particular
allowing for processes of ARMA-GARCH-type which are key to financial appli-
cations. For the case aZ > 6, Bücher and Kojadinovic (2016) show a general
multiplier bootstrap theorem for dependent data and multipliers of the type
as in Assumption 2 for the case of standard copulas. This is key for formally
deriving the consistency of the tapered multiplier bootstrap with block length
l(n) → ∞, where l(n) = O (n1/2−) , 0 <  < 0.5., but the theoretical extension to
tail copulas is non-trivial and left for future research.
We construct the tapered multiplier bootstrap with a dependent multiplier
series as in Assumption 2 entering both empirical copula and marginal empiri-
cal distribution in (5). In each bootstrap round b, these yield the tapered version
22
of test statistic Ŝm,(b),tap by plugging them into equation (4), from which the final
Ŝm,?,tap can be constructed for each m = 1, . . . ,M .
For the choice of multiplier block length l under which the generated mul-
tiplier series mimics the resulting dependence structure of Z we follow Bücher
and Ruppert (2013) in their implementation guidelines setting l(n) = 1.25n1/3.
Moreover, for the tapered block multiplier bootstrap, we employ the uniform
kernel κ1, and use Γ(q, q)-distributed base multipliers, with q = 1/(2l(n) − 1),
where l(n) is the multiplier block length, which can be automatically deter-
mined using from the R-package npcp, see Kojadinovic (2015). Our compre-
hensive simulation study underlines the validity of the tapered multiplier boot-
strap for the empirical tail copula, suggesting that Ŝm,?,tap w→ Sm for m = 1, . . . ,M .
With this approach the tail dependence structure is not polluted due to poten-
tial model misspecification from pre-filtering which may be a problem for large,
high-dimensional data sets where automatic GARCH fitting is challenging and
computationally expensive.
4.2 Simulations
We now compare the finite sample performance of our test with the TDC test,
and the BD13 test. We focus on non-parametric tests as in practice parametric
specifications may suffer from a model bias, especially if intra-tail asymmetry is
not accounted for. We study two types of dependence models that are frequently
used in finance. First, we employ the (implicit) factor model copula. See Fama
and French (1992), Einmahl et al. (2012), and Oh and Patton (2017) for factor
models in finance, tail dependence of factor models, and tail dependence of
factor copulas in finance, respectively. Second, representing the broad class
of Archimedean copulas, we employ the Clayton copula, which models solely
lower tail dependence. Its lean parametric form makes the Clayton copula a
popular building block for more complex copula models, such as mixtures of
copulas, see Rodriguez (2007) and Patton (2006). For each copula, we impose
one parametrization that fulfills the null, and one that violates the null, leaving
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us with four DGPs.
DGP1 and DGP2 are based on the tail factor model. Bivariate return vectors
Z = (Z(1), Z(2)),Z = X,Y, follow a bivariate factor model with r factors V (j), j =
1, ..., r, and loadings aij, i = 1, 2, j = 1, ..., r, when
Z(i) =
r∑
j=1
aijV
(j) + ε(i), i = 1, 2, (7)
where factors are i.i.d. Fréchet with ν = 1, independent of the error term ε(i)
which feature thinner tails than V (j); we set ε(i) as Fréchet with νε = 2. In this
way, the matrix of factor loadings A = (aij) directly determines the tail copula
of Z. In particular, the (upper) tail copula of Z is equivalent to the tail copula of
the max factor model Z¯(i) = maxj=1,...,r(aijV (j)), which is
ΛU(x(1), x(2)) = x(1) + x(2) −
r∑
j=1
max
(
a1j∑r
j=1 a1j
x(1),
a2j∑r
j=1 a2j
x(2)
)
,
see Einmahl et al. (2012) for further details. DGP1 consists of X,Y both result-
ing from a factor model as in Equation (7), but with loading matrix
A1 = [ 2 1 00 1 2 ] .
Here, the first factor only influences X(1) (Y (1)), the second factor influences
both X(1) (Y (1)) and X(2) (Y (2)), and the third factor only influences X(2) (Y (2)).
That is, A1 amounts to intra-tail symmetry and to tail equality between X and Y,
and thus the null is true. See Figure 3, first from the left, for Λ(x(1), 1−x(1)), x(1) ∈
[0, 1]. For DGP2, both X and Y stem from a factor model as in Equation (7) with
A2 = [ 1 01 2 ] ,
where the second factor only influences X(2) (Y (2)), causing the tail copula to
become intra-tail asymmetric, Λ(x(1), x(2)) 6= Λ(x(2), x(1)), and consequently tail
copulas of X and Y coincide only when x(1) = x(2), see Figure (3), second from
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Figure 3: Tail copulas of DGPs 1 to 4 from left to right. Note, for DGP2, the
solid lines represents Λ(x(1), x(2)), x(2) = 1 − x(1), whereas the dashed line shows
Λ(x(2), x(1)). For DGP4, two different specifications of the Clayton copula are
used for X and Y .
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the left. DGP2 thus represents the class of intra-tail asymmetric copulas which
violate the null according to Proposition (1).
For the Clayton copula, only the lower left part of the distribution features
tail dependence,
ΛL(x(1), x(2); θ) = (x(1)
−θ
+ x(2)
−θ
)−1/θ,
ΛU(x(1), x(2); θ) = 0,
where (lower) tail dependence increases in the parameter θ ∈ [0,∞). DGP3
is given by X,Y ∼ Clayton(θ = 0.5); this specific choice of θ implies a TDC
of ι = 0.25, which roughly corresponds to a TDC of a bivariate t-distribution
with correlation 0.5 and four degrees of freedom (McNeil et al. (2005), p.211).
For DGP3, the null is true. See Figure (3), second from the right. For DGP4,
X ∼ Clayton(θ = 0.5), and Y ∼ Clayton(θ = 1). Thus, tail equality is violated as
the TDC of Y is ι = 0.5. See Figure (3), first from the right.
To check whether the test also works for financial time series data, we com-
bine all DGPs with i.i.d. as well as GARCH marginals. We apply the test to raw
GARCH returns, and to standardized GARCH residuals as it is important to an-
alyze whether using estimated residuals affects test performance. Moreover, we
study the test performance for unfiltered returns using the block bootstrap and
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the tapered block multiplier bootstrap. In particular, we employ GARCH(1,1)
dynamics for any marginal return process. We follow Oh and Patton (2013) and
employ bivariate AR-GARCH models. We can link serially dependent marginals
by the (implicit) copulas of DGPs 1 to 4, allowing us to study the effect of condi-
tional heteroscedasticity on test performance. For both bivariate return series
Z = (Z(1), Z(2)),Z = X,Y, it holds
Z
(i)
t = σ
(i)
t η
(i)
t,Z,
σ
2,(i)
t,Z = ω + α
(i)Z
(i)
t−1 + β
(i)η
2,(i)
t−1,Z,
ηZ := (η
(1)
Z , η
(2)
Z ) ∼ iid Fη,Z(x(1), x(2)) = Cη,Z(Fη,Z,1(η(1)Z ), Fη,Z,2(η(2)Z )), t = 1, ..., nZ,
where we set ω = 0.01, α = 0.15 and β = 0.8 such that ω + α + β is close to
one. This mimics parameter values often found in financial returns, see for
example Engle and Sheppard (2001). To impose the tail structures of DGPs
1 to 4 on the time series, we use DGPs 1 to 4 to model the error copula
Cη,Z(Fη,Z,1(η
(1)), Fη,Z,2(η
(2))) and to generate ηt,Z = (η
(1)
t,Z , η
(2)
t,Z): In a first step, we sim-
ulate observations ηt,Z according to DGPs 1 to 4. Consequently, we transform
simulated errors to pseudo-observations by means of the marginal empirical
cumulative distribution, F̂η,Z,i(η
(i)
t,Z), i = 1, 2. Finally, we apply the quantile func-
tion of the t-distribution function with 10 degrees of freedom to the pseudo-
observations. Thus, the final errors are linked by the copulas of DGPs 1 to
4 with fat-tailed t-marginals. Those are used to generate the GARCH series
for X and Y, and standardized residuals obtained from estimation by quasi
maximum likelihood. Note, monotone transformations, such as the quantile
transformation, do not alter the tail dependence structure, and should not al-
ter test results. However, t-transformed error distributions are a more realistic
approximation of asset returns.
For sample sizes n = 750, 1500, varying values of the effective sample size
k, and a nominal test level of α = 0.05, we compare empirical rejection fre-
quencies. Also, for Test Algorithm ((1)), we employ two subset discretizations
(M = 6, 18) to evaluate the sensitivity of the test performance with regard to the
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user-dependent test calibration. Furthermore, we employ Test Algorithm ((2))
which merges 15 different grids with grid sizes Mj = 2j, j = 1, ..., 15,. For some
grids, this implies that subintervals are only roughly of equal length. The TDC
test is carried out using the multiplier bootstrap at points x(1) = x(2) = 0.5. The
number of simulations is S = 500 for each setting.
Table (1) reports empirical rejection frequencies for i.i.d. marginals, fil-
tered GARCH marginals, unfiltered GARCH marginals, GARCH marginals with
the block and tapered bootstrap, and sample size n = 1500 while we refer to
the online appendix for simulation results with n = 750; As non-parametric
methods for tail dependence are often criticized for unsatisfactory small sam-
ple performance, it is worth studying test behavior for small and moderate
sample sizes. Also, we study the effect of varying the effective sample size,
k ∈ {b0.1nc, b0.2nc, b0.3nc}. Note, Λ(x(1), x(2); k = k∗) = Λ(ax(1), ax(2); k = ak∗). Hence,
these values for k correspond to b0.05nc, b0.1nc, b0.15nc in the standard case of
TDC estimation with x(1) = x(2) = 1.
In general, both Test ((1)) and Test ((2)) appear to be consistent. For i.i.d.
marginals, both obey the nominal test size of α = 0.05 (DGP1 and DGP3), ir-
respective of the choice of k. This is particularly important for Test ((2)) as
it points out that grid-specific p-values appear to be sufficiently dependent to
keep empirical size below α, although no additional multiplicity penalty is ap-
plied. While empirical test size remains untouched by k, the choice of effective
sample size notably affects empirical power; for example, for DGP4, power in-
creases by up to 25% both for M = 6, 18. Hence, this suggests a larger choice of
k is favorable. As noted in Bücher and Dette (2013), for a large k, bias terms
in Λ̂X and Λ̂Y cancel out. This suggests the choice of k, which in essence is
a bias-variance problem for Λ̂, is slightly facilitated compared to other extreme
value-based peaks-over-threshold problems. Thus, k ≈ 0.1n seems a reasonable
rule of thumb.
While single-grid tests (Test ((1))) show larger power than the TDC test, the
BD13 test is more powerful in standard cases compared to Test ((1)). However,
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combining a multiple of single-grid tests, e.g. Test Algorithm ((2)), makes our
test consistently more powerful than BD13.
Importantly, our test successfully rejects in case of intra-tail asymmetries,
as shown by the empirical rejection frequencies for DGP2. Both the TDC test
and BD13 test fail to reject the null in this case and completely ignore intra-
tail asymmetries. If the tail copula is intra-asymmetric, our power of our tests
increases in the number of employed subsets. If the tail copula is symmetric,
however, power decreases in M . It is thus advisable to apply Test ((2)).
Also, test results for GARCH filtered returns are in line with i.i.d. series. The
estimation step of the GARCH residuals does not downgrade neither test power
nor size. However, unfiltered GARCH returns should not be used: In the case
of DGP4, test power implodes by roughly 50− 75% for all three tests. Empirical
sizes for DGP1 are still fine, whereas empirical size of DGP3 generally is too
large.
The tapered block multiplier bootstrap produces results comparable to the
multiplier bootstrap-based on i.i.d. and GARCH filtered marginals. Thus, we
prefer a bootstrap adjustment over GARCH-filtering to address serial depen-
dence it can handle serially dependent data and does not require pre-estimation
of a parametric model. However, as Table (1 Appx) in Appendix B of the online
supplement suggests, the tapered block bootstrap should only be applied for
larger sample sizes, since for n = 750 and GARCH marginals the tapered mul-
tiplier block bootstrap appears to be oversized and hence GARCH-filtered data
should be used instead.
Finally, we find our aggregating test (Test ((2))) is throughout most powerful,
while the test with fixed grids (Test ((1))) is consistently more powerful than the
TDC test, slightly less powerful than the BD13 test, and more powerful than
the latter in case of intra-tail asymmetry.
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Table 1: Empirical rejection probabilities for α = 5%, S = 500 repetitions
and sample size n = 1500. Effective sample fraction k/n is evaluated at
(x(1), x(2)) = (1, 1). DGP1: factor model satisfying H0. DGP2: factor model violat-
ing H0. DGP3: Clayton copula satisfying H0. DGP4: Clayton copula violating
the null. Rejection frequencies are shown for a varying effective sample size,
i.i.d. marginals and GARCH marginals for which the tests are applied to raw
observations (unfiltered) and also to standardized residuals (filtered). For the
latter, estimation was carried out by quasi maximum likelihood.
k/n DGP1 DGP2 DGP3 DGP4
TDC BD13 BS16 TDC BD13 BS16 TDC BD13 BS16 TDC BD13 BS16
18 6 TA(2) 18 6 TA(2) 18 6 TA(2) 18 6 TA(2)
iid
5% 4.0 3.2 3.2 2.4 4.8 3.2 4.2 100 100 100 5.0 4.8 3.2 4.2 6.8 73.8 86.2 78.2 82.2 88.2
10% 2.0 3.8 2.0 2.4 5.4 4.0 4.4 100 100 100 2.2 3.6 3.4 2.8 4.8 91.8 97.6 94.8 95.8 98.2
15% 4.4 3.2 2.8 2.6 6.0 5.2 5.8 100 100 100 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.4 7.0 96.6 99.8 98.4 98.6 100
fil.
5% 3.4 4.4 2.8 3.4 5.8 5.4 7.6 100 100 100 3.6 4.0 3.0 2.8 5.8 73.8 86.2 78.2 82.2 87.2
10% 4.0 4.4 2.4 3.8 5.8 5.0 7.6 100 100 100 4.4 3.8 3.4 2.6 6.6 92.6 97.4 95.6 96.0 97.8
15% 5.2 4.0 3.0 3.0 5.4 9.2 8.8 100 100 100 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.4 7.0 97.2 98.8 97.6 98.4 98.8
unfil.
5% 6.0 6.6 4.2 4.6 8.0 8.6 12.6 83.2 52.0 86.8 9.6 12.4 8.6 9.8 14.2 17.8 21.2 18.0 19.2 24.6
10% 4.6 5.8 4.0 4.6 7.4 6.6 8.8 100 100 100 7.0 11.4 9.0 9.8 14.8 22.0 31.0 25.4 26.2 34.6
15% 4.8 4.2 3.0 4.2 6.4 5.6 7.8 100 100 100 6.8 7.4 6.4 6.0 10.2 33.2 44.2 35.8 39.8 48.0
blo.
5% 6.6 5.0 3.6 3.4 6.6 8.0 8.0 73.4 40.2 81.4 7.4 11.0 8.8 9.4 14.6 37.0 44.6 39.0 42.6 49.0
10% 6.0 4.8 3.4 4.0 5.4 6.6 6.6 100 99.8 100 5.6 8.0 8.4 7.8 13.0 70.4 80.0 70.2 76.0 82.8
15% 6.0 5.0 3.2 3.4 5.8 5.6 6.4 100 100 100 4.0 7.2 8.0 6.6 12.8 88.0 94.0 90.8 92.2 95.0
tap.
5% 3.8 4.8 2.6 3.8 6.0 5.4 6.8 100 100 100 3.8 4.2 2.6 2.2 6.0 75.8 85.6 77.8 82.6 87.8
10% 3.8 4.6 2.6 3.2 5.6 5.4 7.4 100 100 100 4.2 3.4 4.0 2.6 6.4 92.8 97.6 95.2 96.8 97.8
15% 5.2 4.0 2.8 3.0 4.8 4.4 4.6 100 100 100 4.4 5.0 3.8 3.4 6.8 97.0 99.0 97.4 98.4 99.0
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5 TAIL ASYMMETRIES IN THE US STOCK MARKET
Related studies, e.g. Ang and Chen (2002), focus on tail asymmetries in pairs
of international stock indices, and point out that, especially during financial
crises, correlations mainly between extreme losses increase. We are inter-
ested whether this finding also applies for sector pairs in the US stock market.
Hence, we study possible tail asymmetries between daily returns of 49 US in-
dustry sectors. The dataset, available at http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/
pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html, accessed on 03/01/2016,
contains nearly 90 years of weighted returns of CRSP SIC codes-based indus-
tries of NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks. Fama and French (1994) and Chang
et al. (2013) analyze earlier versions of this dataset.
We proceed as follows. We aim to detect tail asymmetry dynamics within
the US stock market. Applying a rolling window analysis with window length of
n = 1500, i.e. nearly six years, and a step size of 250 trading days, i.e. roughly
14 months, we arrive at 74 (overlapping) time periods. In each period, we build
all possible bivariate industry combinations ,X = (X(i), X(j)), and test the nulls
H0 : Λ
U
X = Λ
L
X.
Discarding pairs with missing data, in each period, there are at most 1176 pairs
to test against tail asymmetry. In total, we apply the test approximately 85, 000
times. To avoid possible model risk by pre-filtering the returns, we throughout
analyze raw returns using the tapered block multiplier bootstrap; Section 4.1
and the results of the simulation study justify this approach. For completeness,
however, we also computed results from GARCH pre-filtering. As there are
only minor differences to the results from tapered bootstrap we only provide
them in Appendix C of the Web-Appendix. We set the window parameter of the
tapered block multiplier bootstrap to l = 8. Yet, we find no change of results
worth mentioning when altering l. Also, we fix the effective sample size to
k = 0.2n. This, too, is inspired by the findings in the simulation study. We are
30
not interested in particular industry pairs as our focus is on tail asymmetry
of the general market. Hence, a fixed k for all pairs is an operable solution
to the question of number of extremes as over- and underestimation might
eventually balance out when aggregating test decisions over all 1176 pairs. Note,
this section studies tail asymmetries. In the online appendix, we also provide
an empirical study on tail inequalities between foreign exchange rates.
To grasp the general evolution of lower and upper bivariate tails, we intro-
duce a descriptive measure for upper and lower market tail dependence. In
period t, for each pair i, we integrate the empirical tail copula Λ̂i(φ, 1 − φ) over
[0, 1] and provide empirical location statistics across all pairs, e.g. the mean and
empirical quantiles. For the mean,
Λt :=
1(
nt
2
) (nt2 )∑
i=1
∫ 1
0
Λ̂i(φ, 1− φ)dφ,
where nt is the number of sectors in period t, and empirical quantiles are com-
puted accordingly. It is easy to see that
∫ 1
0
Λ(φ, 1 − φ)dφ ∈ [0, 0.25]. The lower
(upper) bound is attained if pair i has no (perfect) tail dependence. Figure (4)
shows the trajectory of the mean and q-quantiles, q ∈ {0.01, ..., 0.99}, for both
upper and lower tails covering 1931 - 2015.
The null hypothesis of tail equality is tested by the TDC test, the BD13 test
and Test ((2)), which aggregates over 15 grids in the spirit of the simulation
study. Figure 5 displays trajectories of the share of rejections for each test, i.e.
the share of tail asymmetric pairs according to each test. Figure 6 documents
the importance of non-standard tail events, i.e. non-TDC events that occur off
the diagonal (x(1) = x(2)).
All tests indicate that most of the time, a substantial amount of tail asymme-
tries exists in the market. We find that our test reveals more tail asymmetries
than competing tests which we attribute to non-diagonal tail dependence and
intra-tail asymmetry. Furthermore, we find tail asymmetry typically vanishes
during financial crises, expect for the subprime crisis when tail asymmetries
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occurred more frequently than shortly before and afterwards. This finding may
reflect the classical risk-return trade-off with a new livery: As lower tail de-
pendence, i.e. the risk of joint extreme losses, spikes during financial distress,
opportunities for joint extreme gains must counteractively increase as we detect
more tail asymmetries during bear markets.
On average, our test finds that 64% (sd=0.25) of all pairs exhibit tail asym-
metry. We can identify a long lasting phase of pronounced tail asymmetries
between 1940-70 where on average 80% (sd=0.10) of all pairs are tail asym-
metric. Collapses of the number of tail asymmetries strikingly coincide with
of financial crises, such as the beginning of the Great Depression (1932-37),
the Oil Crisis (1968-74 until 1972-78), Black Monday (1987) and the Asian
and millennium crisis accumulating into the Dot-Com crisis (1995 - 2003). It
is empirically documented that in crises losses increasingly move in extreme
ways. We can only conclude that, during crises, the tendency of extreme gains
to co-move also increases. The latter might compensate investors for facing
extreme downside risk in large cross-sections. That is to say, when bivari-
ate losses occur more frequently, one can also expect more bivariate extreme
gains. In contrast, the recent financial crisis 2007-09 is characterized by a
temporary bump in tail asymmetries which subtends a phase of steady decline
of tail asymmetries since the mid 1990s. One might argue that, in contrast to
former financial crises, only tail dependence between losses was affected. But
tail dependence between gains did not experience such change. This makes the
subprime crises particularly disastrous as investors did not encounter much
extreme upside potential. However, aggregated tails of the market (Figure 4)
hardly back this conclusion as we observe a nearly parallel progression of both
upper and lower tail measures. Thus, by aggregating bivariate tails to an index
measure, much information on the tail dependence between tails of the index’
constituents is lost. While the summary measures for market tail dependence
suggest left and right tails are connected equally strongly during the 2000s, all
three tests report otherwise and reveal a pattern not captured by descriptive
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statistics. This implies tail measures for indices do not tell the same story their
constituents can.
In comparison to the two competing tests, our test consistently detects more
asymmetries, see Figure 6 (left), which we attribute to the fact that competing
tests overlook non-central tail dependence structures (TDC test), or intra-tail
asymmetry (TDC test, BD13 test). Hence, our test provides a more accurate
assessment of tail asymmetry within the market and suggests tail asymmetry
is more common than expected. With respect to the TDC test (BD13 test), we
find 2.5%−27% (0%−12%) more tail asymmetric pairs. We also plot the trajectory
of the percentage of rejections where, for Test (1) with M = 14, the adjusted p-
value of the central subinterval does not suggest a rejection, while at least one
non-central p-value does (solid line, Figure 6). This line runs nearly parallel
to the graph of the differential in found tail asymmetries between the TDC test
and our test.
To further underline the importance of non-standard tail dependence struc-
tures, we quantify the number of tail asymmetric pairs that scalar approaches
would miss due to off-diagonal tail asymmetries. In Figure 6 (right), for each
period, we compare the number of rejections of non-central subintervals with
the number of rejections found in the central subinterval. We find that our test,
when restricted to non-diagonal subintervals, finds up to 20% more asymme-
tries than a TDC-based analysis that solely focuses on the central subinterval.
Throughout the sample, there exists at least one non-central subinterval with
more test rejections than the central subinterval. Furthermore, there are peri-
ods of time – which match the major financial crises – where not considering
off-diagonal parts of the TC is especially serious. Yet, in the finance literature,
e.g. Jondeau (2016), it is common practice to analyze tail dependence solely by
the tail dependence coefficient ι, i.e. the tail copula along the diagonal where
x(1) = x(2). We document that this approach might overlook non-standard types
of tail dependence leading to a substantial misconception of tail asymmetry. A
more detailed picture of the local impact on tail asymmetry is provided in Figure
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7 which marks rejection frequencies for specific quantile regions as discussed
in Subsection 3.2. This could directly translated into investment and hedging
strategies.
Furthermore, the difference in found asymmetries between our test and
BD13 suggests some degree of intra-tail asymmetry among all pairs. The
simulation study demonstrated both tests’ power differs mainly in intra-tail
asymmetric cases. Applying tests against intra-tail symmetry (Kojadinovic and
Yan (2012); Bormann (2016)), we quantify the importance of intra-tail asym-
metries for tail asymmetries. Both test check the (tail) copula against non-
exchangeability with Cramér-von Mises tests, while the latter tests explicitly
accounts for serial dependence, and is thus more appropriate here. We use a
significance level of α = 0.05. For periods with the smallest and the largest dis-
crepancy in the number of test rejections between our test and the BD13 and
the TDC test, respectively, we test for intra-tail asymmetries. Table 2 contains
the test results. Intra-tail asymmetry of a sector implies one sector’s extremes
are more likely to trigger extreme events of the other sector. This demands
special care in hedging as anticipation of (conditional) extremes is uneven. For
small (large) discrepancies, we expect no (a) significant portion of test rejec-
tions. When our test does not find substantially more tail asymmetries than
BD13 during 1975–81 (TDC during 1977-83), we detect only 4.1% (3.5%) intra-
tail asymmetric pairs. On the other hand, this share rises to 12.5% (9.13%)
when our test is more powerful with respect to detecting tail asymmetry (BD13
during 1938–1943, TDC during 1945–51). Although the share of found intra-
tail asymmetries is relatively small, this supports the conjecture that intra-tail
asymmetry explains the differences in test results.
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Figure 4:
∫ 1
0
Λ̂(x, 1 − x)du for all possible pairs (up to 1176) in each period; dark
line: empirical mean; gray lines: empirical quantiles: 0.01i, i = 1, ..., 99. Left:
losses. Right: gains.
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Table 2: ITA test results. We test against ITA in periods when results of our
test and competing tests are most (least) similar, i.e. when the shares of test
rejections is the largest (the closest). See also Figure 5. In such periods, we
report the share of bivariate tails that the test identifies as intra-asymmetric.
BD13 TDC
test results period ITA period ITA
similar
1975-81 4.1% 1977-83 3.5%
maximally different
1938-43 12.5% 1945-51 9.13%
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Figure 5: Dynamics of the percentage of detected tail asymmetries among all
pairs using a rolling window of size n = 1500, and a step size of 250 trading days
for the TDC test (dashed), BD13 test (dotted) and our test (solid), respectively.
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Figure 6: (Left) Difference of detected asymmetries in percentage points with
respect to the TDC test (dashed) and BD13 test (dotted), and percentage of
our test’s rejections that are induced by subintervals off the diagonal, based
on a grid with M = 14. (Right) Number of rejections in subsets Ii, i = 1, 2, ..., 7,
i.e. off-diagonally, compared to number of rejections in subsets I4, i.e. around
(x(1) = 0.5, x(2) = 0.5), based on a grid with M = 14.
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Figure 7: Localization of test rejections. Both figures show applications the
localization idea of Figure 2. (Left) Histogram of rejection frequencies of spe-
cific quantile regions for J = 14, aggregated over every tail comparioson over
all periods. (Right) Test rejection frequencies translated to quantile regions in
[0, 1]2.
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6 CONCLUSION
We propose a novel test against asymmetries/inequalities between tail depen-
dence functions. The test is based on the empirical tail copula and conducts
piecewise comparisons between tail copulas. Importantly, our test consid-
ers intra-tail asymmetries and achieves higher power in intra-tail asymmet-
ric cases, and slightly higher power else. The test idea may also be applied
for general copula comparisons, and also for tail dependence comparisons in
higher dimensions. An empirical study of US stock market sectors and foreign
exchange rates shows our test typically finds more asymmetries/inequalities
than competing tests; we find time periods where our test clearly benefits from
respecting non-diagonal TC differences, meaning our test detects substantially
more opportunities to hedge tail risks.
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APPENDIX A: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2. .
Equation (3) guarantees convergence of the empirical tail copula
√
kZΛ̂Z(x
(1),
x(2)),Z = X,Y, for (x(1), x(2)), (v(1), v(2)) ∈ R2+. Define
∆̂(x(1), x(2), v(1), v(2)) =:
√
kY/(kX + kY)Λ̂X(x
(1), x(2))−
√
kX/(kX + kY)Λ̂Y(v
(1), v(2)),
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which is a sum of rescaled tail copula processes with GΛ̂,Z,Z = X,Y, is a bivariate
Gaussian process. It directly follows from Equation (3) that
∆̂(x(1), x(2), v(1), v(2))
w→ ∆(x(1), x(2), v(1), v(2))
:=
√
kY/(kX + kY)GΛ̂,X(x
(1), x(2))−
√
kX/(kX + kY)GΛ̂,Y(v
(1), v(2)).
Only under the null E(∆(x(1), x(2), v(1), v(2))) = 0 for corresponding vectors x,v. By
the continuous mapping theorem ∆̂2(x(1), x(2)) w→ ∆2(x(1), x(2)). For a fixed grid
I(i), and some subinterval [a, b] ⊂ I(i), 0 < a < b < ∞, consider the test statistic
corresponding to the ith null H0,i that integrates over [a, b], i.e. Ŝi,[a,b]. Then it
directly follows ∆̂2i (x
(1), 1 − x(1)) w→ ∆2i (x(1), 1 − x(1)), x(1) ∈ [a, b]. Under the null of
H0 : ΛX = ΛY, for all i, ∆̂2i
w→ 0 as ∆2i = 0. Under the alternative, there naturally is
at least one subinterval where the test statistic does not converge to zero.
Proof of Proposition 2. . The statement directly follows from Theorem 3.4. in
Bücher and Dette (2013).
Proof of Proposition 4. .
We show that individual tests are asymptotically undersized. Due to this,
grid-specific p-values need not to be perfectly dependent.
For Test (1) with Mj subsets, denote the test statistic corresponding to
the minimal p-value by S∗j , and the denote the factor of S
∗
j by υj := (kX,j +
kY,j)/(kX,jkY,j), where kX,j, kY,j denote the realized effective sample sizes of X and
Y in the subinterval corresponding to p∗j . Obviously,
υj ≤ υ := (kX + kY)/(kXkY),
and υj decreases in both kX,j and kY,j, while kZ,j, kY,j both decrease in the fine-
ness of the grid (j → ∞): The finer the grid, the smaller kZ,j, i.e. less observa-
tions are in each subinterval. For υ, a test against copula equality would be
asymptotically exact, i.e. P(p ≤ α|H0)→ α, under (A1)-(A4).
Realize that – under the null – the test statistic integrates over squared dif-
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ferences of centralized normal variables. We may approximate the right tail
of the null distribution by a centered χ2 distribution with, say, $j > 0, de-
grees of freedom; see Beran (1975). Hence, for x large enough, test size can
be approximated as αj := P(S˜∗j > x|H0) ∼ χ2($j), j = 1, ..., J, where S˜∗j denotes
the theoretical test statistic corresponding to the adjusted p-value p˜∗j . Also, for
the variance of the test statistic, it holds that V(S˜j) = O(υ2j ), i.e. the variance
increases as grid fineness increases (j ↓) and less observations enter the esti-
mation (kX,j, kY,j ↓, υi ↑). According to the Markov inequality, with fixed critical
values xj,
αj := P(S˜∗j ≥ xj|H0) ≤
E(S˜∗j )
xj
=
V(S˜∗j )/2
xj
) = O(V(S˜∗j )),
i.e. under the null, realized test sizes αj decrease with rate υ2j . Furthermore,
grid-specific p-values are continuous and uniformly distributed. Now, Sklar’s
Theorem implies their dependence under the null can be characterized by a
copula, Cα, say, i.e. Cα(u) = P(p˜∗1 ≤ u(1), ..., p˜∗J ≤ u(J)|H0). Under the null, the
FWER in terms of the copula Cα, is given by
P(∪Jj=1p˜∗j ≤ α|H0) = 1− Cα(1− α1, ..., 1− αJ), . (8)
For illustration, let nearly any observations at all fall in relevant subintervals,
i.e. ∀j : υj ≈ 0,
1− Cα(1− α1(υ1), ..., 1− αJ(υJ)) ↓ 1− Cα(1, ..., 1) = 0,
and Test (2) naturally obeys the α-limit in this unrealistic case. In all other
cases, as J →∞, for FWER control P(∪Jj=1p∗j ≤ α|H0) ≤ α, it must hold that
1− Cα(1− α1(υ1), ..., 1− αJ(υJ))↗ α?(υ?),
where α? := max(α1(υ1), ..., αJ(υJ)) → 0. This means, for FWER control, the cop-
ula Cα must approach its upper bound – (α1, ..., αJ) must be nearly perfectly
dependent – but the upper bound does not need to be exactly obtained due to
40
αj → 0, j = 1, ..., J.
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